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Abstract 
 
New and more complex partnerships are emerging to address the sustainability of natural 
resource use in developing countries. These partnerships variously link donors, governments, 
community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business, 
certification agencies and other intermediaries. High expectations and many resources have 
been invested in these initiatives. Yet, we still do not know whether more sophisticated 
organizational structures, more stakeholders involved, and more advanced participatory 
processes have  delivered better sustainability outcomes, and if so, in what sectors and under 
what circumstances. To fill this knowledge gap and build capacity in this area, the NEPSUS 
research and capacity building project assembles a multidisciplinary team to analyze 
sustainability partnerships in three key natural resource sectors in Tanzania: forestry, wildlife 
and coastal resources. In each of these sectors, we assess whether co-management with local 
communities and private and civil society actors, and putatively more participatory processes 
in the governance of renewable resources, result in more equitable and sustainable 
livelihoods and environmental outcomes. We compare ‘more complex’ partnerships to 
relatively ‘simpler’, more traditional top-down and centralized management systems, and to 
instances where sustainability partnerships are not in place. This working paper tackles the 
main conceptual, methodological and research design issues arising in this effort.  
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1. Introduction 
 
New and more complex partnerships are emerging to address the sustainability of natural 
resource use in developing countries. These partnerships variously link donors, governments, 
community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business, 
consultants, certification agencies and other intermediaries. High expectations and many 
resources have been invested in these initiatives. Yet, we still do not know whether more 
sophisticated organizational structures, more stakeholders involved, and more advanced 
participatory processes have  delivered better sustainability outcomes, and if so, in what 
sectors and under what circumstances.  
 
To fill this knowledge gap and build capacity in this area, the New Partnerships for 
Sustainability (NEPSUS) research and capacity building project assembles a 
multidisciplinary team to analyze sustainability partnerships in three key natural resource 
sectors in Tanzania: forestry, wildlife and coastal resources. In each of these sectors, 
NEPSUS assesses whether co-management with local communities and private and civil 
society actors, and putatively more participatory processes in the governance of renewable 
resources, result in more equitable and sustainable livelihoods and environmental outcomes. 
It compares these ‘more complex’ partnerships to relatively ‘simpler’, more traditional top-
down and centralized management systems and to instances where sustainability partnerships 
are not in place. Within-sector comparisons allow a fine-tuned analysis that is cognizant of 
historical, location and resource-specific issues, which can be used as input to resource-
specific policy and partnership design. Comparison across the three different sectors allows 
the identification of possible common experiences and lessons that can be applied to natural 
resource governance more broadly.  
 
Tanzania is an ideal case to examine these issues because it has implemented several policy 
reforms involving new forms of partnerships in these sectors (Ramutsindela and Noe 2012, 
Rantala and Di Gregorio 2014). Tanzania is considered a model of decentralization and 
participatory approaches in forestry, wildlife and coastal resources. This is because, unlike 
other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, Tanzania does not have the problem of 
defining what is a ‘community’ in community-based natural resource governance. The Local 
Governments Act (1982, Decentralization) provides a legal definition of a community: a 
village. Hence, decentralization goes all the way down to the village level, unlike in other 
countries where the meaning of a community remained contested for many years. Yet, the 
implementation of what is stipulated in the numerous policies and laws remains conflictual 
and contested in forestry (Nelson and Blomley 2010, Treue et al 2014, Wily and Dewees 
2001), wildlife (Igoe and Croucher 2007, Nelson and Agrawal 2008, Noe 2010) and coastal 
resources (Cinner et al 2012, Nunan 2014). Natural resources remain a key component of 
rural livelihoods in Tanzania (Dokken and Angelsen 2015), and the role of these new 
partnerships is highly significant, particularly given the proliferation of initiatives related to 
REDD+ and the co-management of wildlife, coastal resources and forests – and their 
tourism-related sustainability components (Benjaminsen et al 2013, Blomley and Ramadhani 
2006, Cinner et al 2012, Hara and Nielsen 2003, Lund et al 2017, Nelson and Blomley 2010, 
Sulle et al 2014).  
 
In academic and policy networks seeking sustainable development there is a great deal of 
enthusiasm and energy invested in new and increasingly complex multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. In natural resource governance, new partnership configurations promise more 
equitable and sustainable outcomes, because they entail various combinations of participation 
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by donor agencies, national and local governments, community-based organizations, local 
and international NGOs, business, industry associations and certification agencies 
(Brockington 2002, 2009, Berkes 2007, Ramutsindela et al 2011, Van Wijk et al 2015). 
While partnerships between state and non-state actors are not particularly new, what is ‘new’ 
in these emerging partnerships is twofold: (1) they entail more complex networks of actors; 
and (2) they take more complex organizational forms to ensure ‘best practice’ in deliberation 
and in facilitating co-management with communities and formal participation of various 
stakeholders (Berkes, 2007; Bush et al 2013; Ponte 2014; Mshale 2016).  
 
These sustainability partnerships are taking shape as contexts of, and narratives about, 
resource depletion are changing – bringing new international audiences, alliances and 
policies to bear on previously local and national issues. Linked to a growing sense of 
urgency, development agendas now call for innovative measures and transnational and cross-
sectoral cooperation and investments (Borras et al 2011). Thus, wildlife resources now matter 
in the context of the severe increase in extinction rates due to human activities, wildlife crime 
and poaching; illegal fishing matters in the context of the global decline of capture fisheries; 
and forest cover in developing countries matters in the context of global climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. With a similar sense of urgency, experiences of nature’s 
wilderness and pristine status are being promoted as compensatory, even emancipatory 
features, almost essential for balancing stressful busy lives of modern consumers (West et al 
2006), leading to an intense commodification of nature and land into ecotourism products 
(Igoe and Brockington 2007, Wearing and Wearing 1999). While conventional narratives on 
resource depletion place the blame exclusively on actors and processes within the Global 
South, emerging narratives increasingly link local and global factors and actors (Duffy and 
Moore 2011, Kottak 1999, Moscardo 2011).  
 
Political ecology approaches have shown that these relations are creating new kinds of values 
to previously existing resources and attracting more actors in competing for their access and 
utilization (see, i.e., Remis and Hardin 2009). New actors are appearing or becoming more 
prominent as old products and services (e.g. timber, fish, wildlife tourism) come under 
processes of sustainability certification or are more closely monitored. New products are 
being devised through new forms of commodification of nature (e.g. carbon credits and 
payments for ecosystem services), which require a similarly complex apparatus operating 
from local to global levels (Mshale 2016). Thus, in addition to a push towards more adaptive, 
participatory and collaborative management, new partnerships are arising in part to initiate or 
strengthen these commodification processes (Brockington and Duffy 2011, Duffy and Moore 
2011, Igoe and Brockington 2007, Nelson and Agrawal 2008, Stone and Nyaupane 2016, 
Wearing and Wearing 1999). By inserting economic logics related to pricing, promotion and 
product volume into the conservation decision making, commodification distorts the scope 
and purpose of conservation partnerships from unbiased protection (West et al 2004) adding 
new layers of complexity to the understanding of partnership dynamics. 
 
Much research on the governance of natural resources so far has focused on the institutional 
features, potential, construction and participatory elements of these partnerships at the 
local/national levels (e.g., Brockington 2007, Igoe and Croucher 2007, Levine 2002, Mshale 
2008, Nelson and Agrawal 2008, Treue et al 2014, Van Wijk et al 2015) and transnationally 
(e.g., Cashore et al 2004, Duffy and Moore 2011, Gulbrandsen 2010, Pattberg 2007, 
Glasbergen et al 2007), and on ethnographies of conservation-development funding and of 
experts (e.g., Koch 2016, Lund et al 2017). The literature on local partnerships has shown 
that different configurations have resulted in both success and failure (e.g. Agrawal et al 
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2011; Blomley et al 2008, Budeanu 2013, Persha et al 2011, Sulle et al 2014, Van Wijk et al 
2015). The presence of many partners and linkages has often been reported as a feature of 
successful community-based initiatives (see, e.g., Berkes 2007), but with little in-depth 
analysis of whether and how socio-ecological contexts shapes outcomes (McLain et al, 
2017). The literature has also shown that the possible erosion of government authority opens 
up opportunities for entrepreneurial actors and alliances to take on the leadership of 
sustainability, but often without a specific mandate or clear guidelines.  
 
An important dynamic of local partnerships has been a high degree of devolution and/or 
democratic decentralization (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). While devolution and 
decentralization do not always provide the financial resources anticipated, they can empower 
local communities to effectively negotiate their claims over natural resources (Larson and 
Soto 2008, Stone and Nyaupane 2016) and help building new organizations for channeling 
opposition against resource extraction and impositions from central government (Wright 
2014). Yet, decentralization and devolution can also be appropriated by central governments, 
or unelected authorities, for their own purposes (Benjaminsen et al 2013, Nelson and 
Agrawal 2008, Ribot 2002, 2004, 2006, Sulle et al 2014). We still know little about whether 
these processes are creating platforms for effective multi-stakeholder negotiation for 
sustainable utilization and conservation of natural resources, given a long history of exclusive 
state control (see, e.g. Berkes 2007; Mshale 2016). 
 
NEPSUS builds from these insights to expand our understanding of the features of multi-
stakeholder complexity in sustainability partnerships and how they may shape  sustainability 
outcomes. It combines approaches embedded in political economy, political ecology, natural 
resource governance and social network analysis to examine how partnerships emerge, which 
stakeholders are involved in different issue-areas, and what role variously-positioned brokers 
play in them. NEPSUS examines whether and how different configurations of partnerships 
complexity lead to successful and more equitable outcomes, or to increased conflict and 
failure.  
 
This working paper serves to profile the NEPSUS project conceptually and methodologically. 
Future working papers will provide: in-depth literature reviews; background to the sectors 
and locations where the project will be carrying out fieldwork; results of research activities; 
and theoretical, methodological  and policy-related reflections.  
 
 
2. Knowledge gaps  
 
2.1 Partnership complexity 
 
Sustainability partnerships are one of the tools of what is variously known as interactive, 
collaborative, hybrid or multistakeholder governance (we use these terms interchangeably in 
this paper), defined as a ‘governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly 
engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, 
consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or 
manage public programs or assets’ (Ansell and Gash 2007). The argument for the need of this 
form of governance is that no single institution alone is capable of addressing sustainability 
challenges effectively, equitably and efficiently, and thus the engagement of various 
stakeholders representing the state, business and civil society is essential, together with the 
involvement of local communities (Ansell and Gash 2007, Rana and Chhatre 2017). But the 
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functioning of these partnerships depends on how networks of actors and institutions are 
structured, how power and responsibility are shared and devolved, and what flows within 
them (see e.g. Rana and Chhatre 2017). Values, principles and goals are articulated and 
developed as public and/or private individuals and institutions, engage in social exchange, 
with goals that are not given but negotiated, and are not stable but vary according to the 
strength of participants who come and go (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009). The transfer of 
sustainability challenges away from governmental regulatory powers and into arenas of 
private business interest validates the need for further explorations of the conditions that 
enable or hinder the ability of sustainability partnerships to function and thrive in global 
market places. 
 
Participation of non-state actors in managing renewable natural resources (wildlife, forestry 
and coastal resources) dates back to the 1970s and 1980s. The increasing hegemony of 
broader tenets of the neoliberal orthodoxy, such as democratic decentralization, participation 
and market approaches (see Heynen et al 2007), provided the initial stimulus to the 
emergence of participatory approaches to natural resource governance. Other factors that 
necessitated the move from centralized to decentralized management systems included 
increasing pressure by international conservation organizations and clear failure by resource-
constrained and newly-independent states (see Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Brockington 2005, 
Brosius et al 2005, Western and Wright 1994).  The perceived need for collaboration and 
engagement in partnerships in natural resource governance have become particularly popular 
since the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (Mert 2014). 
They have emerged in the context of increasing willingness by public authority to delegate 
social and environmental regulation to business and civil society actors. At the transnational 
level, in the agro-food and natural resource sectors, many of these initiatives have taken the 
form of ‘stewardship councils’ and ‘sustainability roundtables’1.  
 
These initiatives are increasingly built around a common set of ‘must have’ institutional 
features and procedural elements, which are used to establish a legitimate presence as a 
governance instrument, to fend off possible criticism, and to ‘sell’ sustainability certifications 
and labels to potential users (producers, traders, processors, retailers) (Ponte 2014). They 
usually include an executive board or a board of directors; an assembly or council, often with 
specific chambers that represent different stakeholder interests; technical advisory 
committees of appointed experts; and an executive director with support staff that handle the 
day-by-day operations. Procedural elements include a set of what are now considered ‘best 
practices’ in standard setting, certification and accreditation, and impact evaluation, which 
are built around the concepts of transparency, inclusiveness, consensus and accountability 
(Cheyns 2011). These best practices are inherited and adapted largely from the experience of 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) model and have been subsequently codified by the 
International Social and Environmental Labeling Alliance (ISEAL).2 ISEAL has developed 
1 Multistakeholder schemes in the agro-food and forestry sectors that have ‘stewardship’ or ‘roundtable’ in their title include: 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, established in 1993), the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC, 1999), the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO, 2004), the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RTRS, 2006), the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biofuels (RSB, 2009), the Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC, 2010), and the Sustainable Beef Roundtable (SBR, under 
way). Other multistakeholder initiatives that take a ‘Better’ nomenclature and have similar institutional architectures are 
Bonsucro (formerly the Better Sugar Cane Initiative, 2008) and the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI, 2009). In addition to these, 
we find a host of other multistakeholder initiatives, including those that were developed in the coffee sector and then 
expanded to other commodities, such as Fairtrade (1989/1998), Rainforest Alliance (1993), Utz (2002), and 4C (2006).  
2 ISEAL is an association whose members are social and environmental standard-setting and accreditation organizations. It 
aims at developing guidance for and strengthening the effectiveness and impact of these standards. Its roots stem from a 
meeting held in 1999 by MSC, FSC, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) and Fairtrade 
to discuss the possibility of closer collaboration among standard setting organizations.  
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three ‘Codes of Good Practice’ for setting, assessing, and assuring compliance with social 
and environmental standards.  
 
The governance setup of these initiatives is meant to ensure (if not just signal) a degree of 
professionalization, meaningful participation of relevant stakeholders in key decision-making 
processes, and transparency. As a result, sustainability initiatives are becoming ever more 
complex in how they facilitate formal participation of relevant stakeholders, manage 
deliberation and use technologies/mechanisms that ensure some provision of input even from 
more marginalized actors. Yet, as Cheyns (2011) so vividly shows, there are serious gaps 
between being part of deliberation and being able to shape outcomes. Process consultants 
employed in multi-stakeholder initiatives and partnerships are often related to, or hosted by, 
conservation groups (Duffy and Moore 2011), and use the expedients of urgency, reaching 
consensus, and pragmatism to steer deliberation trajectories in specific directions, define 
categories of ‘stakeholder’ and frame acceptable formats of engagement (see also Mshale 
2016).   
 
Existing knowledge in this field suggests that institutionally complex and putatively more 
democratic and inclusive sustainability initiatives (such as FSC in forestry and RSB in 
biofuels) are challenged by competitor initiatives that are more top-down, less democratic, 
leaner, quicker, more commercially aggressive, and more tuned in with industry interests 
(such as PEFC in forestry and ISCC in biofuels) (Fransen 2012, Ponte 2014). Although 
business-led partnerships are considered more efficient in managing consultative processes 
and achieving desirable outcomes compared to government-led initiatives, successes tend to 
be economic in nature, while social and environmental aspects are given a low profile 
(Farmaki et al 2015). The ever more complex web of institutional and governance features, 
development and managerial systems, time- and resource-consuming meetings, and the 
enactment of procedures to meet ‘good practice’ has often improved governance systems in 
transnational sustainability initiatives and partnerships. However, it has also slowed down 
processes, added costs, and in the long run created stakeholder fatigue.   
 
This uneven picture is also emerging in national and local partnerships for sustainability, 
especially in the field of conservation. These partnerships are diverse and vary by place and 
type of resource, with a large range of structures and functions (Moore and Koontz 2016). 
Some of the literature claims that involving multiple stakeholders through partnerships 
increases the governability of natural resources, that the diversity of participating actors 
enhances the capacity to respond to problems (Huxham et al 2000, Lasker et al. 2001), and 
that highly polycentric organizational structures yield higher environmental outputs than 
monocentric ones (Newig and Fritsch 2009). Existing research also suggests that partnerships 
are more likely to be successful when: there is synergy between actors in terms of resources, 
interests, power, language and culture (Huxham et al 2000, Lasker et al. 2001, Mitchell 2005, 
Vangen 2003); they are backed by a supportive external environment; all stakeholders can 
connect their own interests with the common objective of the partnership (Glasbergen et al 
2007); and when relevant actors bring in not only specific resources and histories to the 
partnership, but also an appropriate mix of resources, knowledge and capabilities (Pattberg 
and Widerberg 2016).  
 
Effectiveness of partnerships seems to be enhanced when actors are ready to negotiate 
alternative solutions and compromises (Newig and Fritsch 2009), when they can leverage 
existing social capital and networks, when stakeholders accept that partnerships evolve over 
time (Vangen 2003), and whey they operate under a clear political mandate, political pressure 
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and/or political support (Kallis et al 2009, Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). Trust is a key 
aspect of success, both in relation to initiating a trust-building loop, and in sustaining it 
(Beierle and Konisky 2001, Schuett et al 2001, Stone 2015, Vangen 2003).  
 
But other research highlights that these partnerships often fail to meet their stated goals due 
to lack organizational capacity and resources, that they are characterized by low or 
unmeasured outcomes, and that they fail to foster inclusiveness of marginalized actors 
(Pattberg and Widerberg 2016). The critical literature suggests that variety of actors in 
partnerships does not per se lead to better outcomes, as each partner represents specific 
interests, may embody different world views, yields different degrees and kinds of power, 
and brings with it specific hopes, expectations and claims (Glasbergen et al 2007, Mitchell 
2005, Olwig 2013, Stone 2015). In these situations, increasing the number of stakeholders 
and the complexity of procedures may actually inhibit rather than facilitate the governance of 
natural resources (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2009).  Actors may indeed have irreconcilable 
interests, no matter how much participants agree on basic values and principles — leading to 
different perceptions of problems and their solutions (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). 
Different capabilities of actors often result into power imbalances. Smaller and weaker actors 
– especially those who do not have capacity, organizational skills, and resources to 
participate as equals in partnerships – are prone to marginalization in decision-making 
(Ansell and Gash 2007, Booher and Innes 2002). Some power imbalances also emerge as a 
result of lack of expert knowledge to engage into more technical discussions (Ansell and 
Gash 2007, Ponte and Cheyns 2013). Yet, others argue that while  too much power imbalance 
is usually seen as a problem and often causes anxiety among participants, too much equality 
may actually hamper the establishment of initiatives or the development of leadership within 
them (Kooiman et al 2005). Furthermore, collaborative arrangements may indeed result in 
conflicts/tensions in the short run, but such short term undesired outcomes may result useful 
in the creation of more durable partnerships seeking longer-term social and environmental 
outcomes (Poteete et al 2010). 
 
Networks are important factors in determining the effectiveness of partnerships in resource 
governance (Henriksen 2015). Actors use their networks to share their experiences, values, 
interests, knowledge and resources, but also to facilitate resource exchange (Booher and 
Innes 2002; Pattberg and Widerberg 2016) and handle possible tensions (Kooiman et al 
2003). At the same time, for a network to survive, it needs the willingness, capabilities and 
resources of the most powerful and influential members of a partnership, thus possibly 
reinforcing existing power imbalances (Pattberg and Widerberg 2016).  
 
Partnership complexity clearly affects the ability to deliver sustainability outcomes. Yet, the 
literature is mostly silent on this issue. A few contributions have focused on complexity in 
terms of the problems to be tackled (Imperial 2005, Kim 2015), highlighting the 
interconnectedness of the natural and social components within the systems that partnerships 
are targeting (Choi and Robertson 2014). As components are interdependent, dealing with 
one component affects another (Imperial 2005, Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). At the same 
time, the complex nature of conservation problems enables powerful actors to pit policies 
against each other in order to elbow out groups that fight against the appropriation of natural 
resources for the benefit of political and business elites (Nelson 2012). This is the case, for 
example, when environmental laws are strategically used as reasons to displace and relocate 
local communities, in order to make land available for eco-tourism developments. Therefore, 
it is relevant to examine how different representations of complexity influence how 
partnerships work and to what end.   
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Another form of complexity that has been highlighted relates to the structure of partnerships 
– in terms of form of interaction between actors and type of organizational membership 
(Kooiman et al 2005). Some actors have daily interactions, while others are involved only in 
specific meetings. Actors are involved differently over time and at different levels of the 
partnership process. Some members are involved as individuals, others represent 
organizations. Actors comes and go, and policies and strategies change over time (Huxham et 
al 2000).  
 
What is missing in both the literatures on transnational and national/local sustainability 
partnerships is an understanding of complexity in its constituent elements – in terms of 
numbers of institutions and partners involved, their diverse background (for profit, social 
enterprise, not for profit, government, network), the multiple scales they operate at, and their 
different core interests. As indicated above, many contributions examine participation, 
transparency, accountability, power relations, resource flows – but we still lack a better 
understanding of the connections between these factors and how different kinds of 
complexity may affect actual sustainability outcomes. We also elaborate on the need to add a 
component of network complexity which locates partnerships in broader structures of ties 
that not only channel resources but also shape power asymmetries and outcomes. NEPSUS 
addresses these gaps by unpacking complexity in and around sustainability partnerships and 
by linking its constitutive elements to sustainability outcomes.  
 
2.2. Processes 
 
Sustainability partnerships in governing natural resources bring together different state and 
non-state actors with often diverse and competing interests. Legitimacy, defined as the 
‘process where partnerships gain recognition and become accepted as a relevant alternative or 
supplement to government policy on a particular issue’ (Glasbergen et al 2007), is crucial for 
sustainability partnerships to establish their authority in governing natural resources. Gaining 
legitimacy depends on interactive structures and processes in which partnership operate. To 
establish and maintain legitimacy, these interventions have to pay attention to the needs, 
power and interests of different actors.  
 
Recent research on sustainability partnerships has highlighted the importance of managing 
legitimacy with different audiences and stakeholders, given that these partnerships cannot 
lean exclusively on the sovereign authority of the state to govern natural resources. This 
literature shows that in order to be effective, partnerships need to achieve a balance of input 
legitimacy (inclusion, balance in stakeholder representation), process legitimacy (governance 
procedures, participatory mechanisms, accountability) and output legitimacy (immediate 
results achieved) (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, Fransen and Kolk 2007, Glasbergen et al 
2007, Gulbrandsen 2010, 2014).  
 
Input and process legitimacy deal with procedural fairness, where the focus is on the quality 
of the decision-making process in terms of deliberation, participation, transparency and 
accountability. In general, for partnerships to gain input and process legitimacy, there should 
be participation of all relevant actors and interests, and particularly of marginalized groups; 
and there should be clear accountability mechanisms and transparency (Bäckstrand 2006, 
Glasbergen et al 2007). Output legitimacy, on the other hand, is associated with a 
consequential logic, and relates to whether governance arrangements contribute to collective 
problem solving or to societal goals such as conservation, wellbeing of local communities, 
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and consciousness raising of ecotourists (Wearing and Wearing 1999). It is shaped by issue 
compliance, implementation and effectiveness. Compliance relates to whether members 
adhere to the agreed norms and rules; implementation is concerned with activities having 
been performed according to plan; and effectiveness is about whether outcomes are achieved 
(Bäckstrand 2006).   
 
The literature has shown that the balance of different kinds of legitimacy varies in different 
resource fields and contexts. While some form of multi-stakeholder governance structure is 
becoming more common across the board, it is also clear that simpler (government- or 
business-driven) initiatives tend to shape governance systems through selective approaches, 
such as by only occasionally interacting with stakeholders, or by including stakeholders as 
representatives but in ways that limit their influence (Beaumont and Dredge 2010, Cheyns 
2011, Fransen 2012, Ponte and Cheyns 2013, Ponte 2014, Ruhanen 2013). 
 
Broadly speaking, the partnerships analyzed by NEPSUS belong to the ‘integrated 
conservation-development’ initiatives that aim at reconciling environmental/conservation 
objectives and livelihood/socio-economic outcomes. The history of conservation in 
developing countries from colonial times to recent years indicates that originally these 
initiatives were introduced primarily for the protection of natural resources to generate 
revenue for the state at the expense of local livelihoods. In Tanzania, the creation of protected 
areas of various kinds in forestry, coastal and wildlife environments often involved active and 
harsh exclusion of local residents. As a result, local communities frequently opted to 
challenge what they perceived as ‘coercive and ineffective state structures and policies for 
managing resources’ (Spaeder and Feit 2005: 149). Two antagonizing forces eventually came 
to bear: (1) communities attempting to enjoy their rights to control land and resources, vis a 
vis ‘outsiders’ trying to bar them from exploiting protected species and resources (Western 
and Wright 1994); and (2) governments starting to introduce policy and actual 
implementation of decentralized forms of governance that combine conservation and 
development objectives (Goble et al 2014), following concerns that the degree of community 
or resource user group involvement in conservation initiatives and programs had been 
previously minimal or absent. 
 
One of the features of the adoption of more decentralized governance of natural resources in 
the past two decades or so, in Tanzania and elsewhere, has been its increasing use of 
partnerships involving communities, different layers of government, civil society groups and 
NGOs, and sometimes business. Some of the main preoccupations in the literature examining 
these partnerships have been the dynamics of community participation, the scale of 
operations, and the legitimacy of these partnerships as governance instruments (see i.a. 
Gustavson et al 2009, Levine 2002, Makoloweka and Shurcliff 1997, Tobey and Torell 2006, 
Wells et al 2010). These are important questions, but remained unanswered in the literature. 
How are communities represented in partnerships (and by whom)? What makes them 
important partners? What are the points of convergence/ divergence of interests? How do 
partnerships gain legitimacy and why do communities accept to participate? What is the 
importance of scale (of conservation) in assessing the impacts of partnerships? How are 
rights regulated and deregulated and by whom? 
 
A large body of literature exists on community participation in the governance of natural 
resources. This literature has focused on processes and impacts of participatory approaches 
(Abbott 1995, Murphree 2009, Ribot 1999), the actual practices of different actors and their 
roles and interests in entering a partnership (Igoe 2010, Sachedina 2010, Saito-Jensen et al 
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2010), as well as the relations of power that determine the distribution of costs and benefits 
(Benjaminsen et al 2013, Dressler et al 2010, Moyo et al 2016). The literature highlights in 
particular that there is a systematic disjuncture between discourses and actual practices of 
donors and governments concerning participation, representation and inclusiveness of 
conservation laws and projects (Ribot et al forthcoming, Wearing and Wearing 1999). This 
work highlights how governance reforms have led to a narrowing of democracy, leading to 
mere counting of numbers of ‘participants’ and ‘group’ representation, rather than 
considering community values, needs and priorities.  
 
The literature also critiques the practices, interests and roles of powerful actors in facilitating 
partnerships with local communities – showing that their actions have empowered some 
actors while disempowering those already marginalized by conservation schemes (Moscardo 
2011, Wearing and Wearing 1999).  Since the initial focus of partnerships has been around 
benefit sharing, rather than cost-benefit sharing (Brockington 2007), most schemes have 
often lead to crisis rather than hope for local communities, have increased community 
burdens, have reinforced  state control over natural resources (Benjaminsen et al 2013, 
Dressler et al 2010), and have failed to achieve their ultimate goals – even though they 
successfully enrolled communities in participatory processes (Moscardo 2011, Noe and 
Kangalawe 2015, Stonich 1998).  
 
Existing research, however, has not paid enough attention to how participatory schemes gain 
legitimacy, to the internal dynamics of power, and to the ways in which learning from (or 
ignoring) previous experiences may determine the outcomes of participation. Partnerships 
have dynamic elements that are constantly re-negotiated by individuals and institutions. They 
are shaped by social capital, which can enhance or inhibit local decision-making capabilities. 
It is therefore important that the assessment of legitimacy of participatory initiatives focuses 
not only on institutions and leaders, but also examines the networks that are woven around 
them, and the rules that govern participatory initiatives (Beaumont and Dredge 2010, 
Bramwell 2011, Ribot 1999). A fresh look is also needed on community contestation and on 
aspects of regulation and re-regulation of access and control in partnerships (Benjaminsen et 
al 2013). 
 
Partnerships are part of larger processes that operate at the global level, and that they are 
embedded in local and national political economies that co-shape their trajectories and 
outcomes. The levels at which partnerships are initiated, and the way different actors 
converge to support these partnerships, are a function of the scale of conservation. The desire 
to initiate large landscapes of conservation requires mobilization of ‘grassroots’ efforts. 
Accordingly, partnerships need to be consistent with the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
requiring establishment of links between conservation and local development objectives 
(Berkes 2007, Kottak 1999). Thus, community-based conservation becomes part of a broad 
approach to biodiversity protection (Young 2003). However, critiques of community 
participation in forestry, wildlife and coastal resources are often limited to local practices of 
different actors rather than the overall scaling process. Likewise, the assessment of costs and 
benefits of community participation does not consider changes in what is considered a 
desirable scale of conservation, and how its construction necessitates the collaboration of 
different actors (Kottak 1999, Legg 2009, Ramutsindela and Noe 2015). 
 
Overall, there seems to be a systematic disjuncture between global discourses and local 
narratives on the process involved in sustainability partnerships (Berkes 2007, Ribot 2003, 
2016), and participation appears to be symbolic rather than substantive (Ribot et al 
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forthcoming) – even leading to disempowerment (Brockington 2005; Noe and Kangalawe 
2015, Ribot et al forthcoming).  In line with calls for assessing different degrees of 
participation (Ribot et al. forthcoming), NEPSUS will contribute towards a better 
understanding of actual practices, norms and partner protocols and learning processes that 
may influence outcomes (both socio-economic and environmental), and of the reality of daily 
lives of communities, rather than only representational performance. NEPSUS will unpack 
participation by focusing on critical examination of factors that influence legitimacy, and 
examine whether the rhetoric supporting the presence of many actors in sustainability 
partnerships pans out in terms of results, given that actors may be of very different nature and 
pursue different objectives.  
 
2.3 Sustainability outcomes 
 
Increasing complexity in terms of actors involved and the nature of institutional arrangements 
has entailed an expansion of the goals of these partnerships (Mshale 2016). To mobilize 
effective participation of non-state actors, governments have to respond to the needs and 
aspirations of local people, businesses, NGOs, the international community and other actors. 
Complex partnerships have to pay attention to both conservation and livelihoods outcomes. 
NEPSUS evaluates whether, how and to what extent they attain environmental and 
livelihood/socio-economic outcomes concurrently. It assesses partnership interventions in 
terms of attaining these outcomes (effectiveness), in relation to resources applied (efficiency), 
and in relation to the distribution of benefits, costs and losses among key partners (equity).  
 
The existing literature on sustainability outcomes has several knowledge gaps when it comes 
to understanding whether and how partnerships achieve their intended objectives. It has 
analyzed socio-economic and environmental outcomes mostly in isolation from each other, 
while often these interventions are introduced to achieve both (Agrawal and Benson 2011). 
This is affected by disciplinary bias, whereby environmental scientists pay little attention to 
social outcomes, and social scientists pay little attention tp environmental outcomes (Ojanen 
et al 2017). It is also affected by difficulties in undertaking multi-disciplinary studies, by 
infancy in the development of methods for jointly assessing socio-economic and 
environmental outcomes (Poteete and Ribot 2011), and by a poor understanding of the causal 
links between interventions  and their outcomes (Agrawal 2001, McLain et al 2017, Ostrom 
2007, 2009, Poteete and Ribot 2011). Moreover, in the existing literature, little attention is 
paid to contextual factors at the local, national and international levels (Agrawal 2001, 
McLain et al 2017).  
 
NEPSUS attempts to fill some of these gaps by: (1) using both detailed qualitative 
description of the partnership types and configuration and mixed methods (qualitative and 
quantitative statistical analysis) to assess socio-economic and environmental outcomes (thus 
following Poteete et al’s 2010 suggestions); (2) using detailed qualitative narratives of 
partnership types and configuration to strengthen causal links between interventions and their 
outcomes building on emerging literature (see e.g. Persha et al, 2010); (3) analyzing 
relationships of synergies and trade-offs between often competing livelihood and 
conservation outcomes through a careful  selection of indicators that assess sustainability 
outcomes; and (4) systematically showing how different kinds of participation dynamics 
under different socio-ecological contexts lead to different sustainability outcomes (thus 
answering the call for understanding contextual factors, as in Agrawal 2001, McLain et al 
2017).  
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3. Research design, conceptual definitions and analytical approaches 
 
The main objective of NEPSUS is to assess comparatively whether and how forms of 
partnership characteristics and dynamics of governance affect sustainability outcomes across 
different renewable resource systems (forestry, wildlife and coastal resources). NEPSUS 
deploys mixed methods to link different forms of partnership complexity to socio-
economic/livelihood and environmental outcomes via a set of process factors. In this section, 
we explain the overall design of NEPSUS, specify the relevant research questions, and define 
the related concepts and analytical strategy.  
 
NEPSUS examines three natural resource systems (wildlife, forestry and coastal resources) 
that are key components of rural livelihood strategies in Tanzania (Benjaminsen et al 2013, 
Dokken and Angelsen 2015, Kalonga et al 2015, Ponte 2002, Snyder and Sulle 2011, Sulle et 
al. 2011, Tolbey and Torell 2006). All three have by now established traditions of: (1) 
centralized, ‘simpler’ and more top-down conservation initiatives (game reserves, forest 
reserves controlled by central or local governments, and marine parks); and (2) various forms 
of ‘more complex’ partnerships that are based on different degrees and forms of co-
management and involve more stakeholders: Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs); 
combinations of Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) with timber certification 
and REDD+ initiatives; and Beach Management Units (BMUs) and related Collaborative 
Fisheries Management Areas (CFMAs). More complex configurations emerged on the basis 
of evidence that pure community-based, private sector, or state control alone cannot 
effectively, equitably and sustainably manage these resources (Ostrom 2007, Rana and 
Chhatre 2017). Since these resource systems feed into different value chains and are 
embedded in specific networks of actors, our comparative approach will enable an analysis of 
whether, how and to what extent context influences the formation and performance of 
partnerships.  
 
Within each sector, the research design is built upon two layers of comparison: (1) between 
‘simpler partnerships’ (SP), ‘more complex partnerships’ (CP), and ‘control’ (C) sites— 
selected in contiguous areas that are as agro-ecologically and socio-economically similar as 
possible; and (2) between ‘early-mover’ (EM) and ‘latecomer’ (L) sites. The logic of 
comparing EM and L sites is to assess whether the latter were able address some of the 
challenges (but also learn from successes) previously experienced in EM sites. Finally, where 
possible, secondary databases and results from previous and current research projects and 
community baseline surveys will be used to build ‘before-after’ comparisons. Attribution of 
sustainability outcomes will be modulated in relation to resource-type specificity and 
contextual and historical factors.  
 
3.1 Partnership complexity 
 
The first group of research questions that guide NEPSUS are related to partnership 
complexity. 
 
RQ1: Complexity  
• What factors account for different degrees of complexity in partnerships for natural 
resource governance?  
• In what local, national and international contexts have these partnerships arisen?  
• What kinds of social networks are woven around them? 
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NEPSUS defines a partnership as a configuration of actors, norms and institutions that 
mediates interactions and distribution of roles and rights for managing a specific renewable 
resource in an identified place. The different degree of overall complexity is determined in 
two steps. First, we examine four layers of complexity for the purpose of fieldwork site 
selection: (1) number of actors involved in the partnerships; (2) number of actor categories; 
(3) complexity of the decision making system; and (4) degree of sharing among different 
actor categories in access rights to the resource. The first two are part of actor multiplicity 
complexity; the second two are part of institutional complexity. This allows us to make a 
preliminary selection of partnerships that are ‘simpler’  and those that are ‘more complex’, 
and to identify control sites with similar agro-ecological and socio-economic features within 
each resource sector.  
 
Given that there is limited variation in complexity factors within each case, a second step will 
be taken after fieldwork to fine-tune, substitute and/or add elements of complexity and how 
they interact with each other. Network complexity is a correlate of how institutional and actor 
traits interact, but these interactions must also be understood in a larger context of the social 
network within which they play out. Through interviews and document analysis, we map the 
organizations and individuals linked to the partnerships who then report on the nature and 
strength of their mutual ties, including technical support ties, funding flows, and legally 
binding contracts. Drawing on Social Network Analysis (SNA) we analyze this data to 
understand the structural variation in the network complexity of the partnerships. The aim of 
this analysis is not to assess how complex partnerships are but to get at what complexities 
they comprise. What relational complexities are linked to processes of collaboration, trust-
building and learning as opposed to destructive power asymmetries and conflicts is an 
empirical question, and NEPSUS breaks new ground in investigating the association between 
network complexity and partnership processes and outcomes. 
 
The second analytical step will also include in-depth contextual and historical analysis to 
assess the possible differential impact of specific complexity factors in shaping partnership 
processes and outcomes. A further factor of partnership complexity, normative complexity 
(complexity of the problem to be solved), is deemed to be relatively constant in all pairs of 
partnership comparison. 
 
The following approaches will be followed to analyze the changing dynamics of partnership 
complexity in the second step: 
 
• Mapping, contextual and historical analysis of partnership types through qualitative 
thematic analysis; we will code data for specific words and themes and examine them 
with qualitative data analysis software (NVivo10).  
• Social network analysis (SNA) will provide an additional measure of partnership 
complexity; it will be used to map the inter-personal and inter-organizational networks to 
delineate: the structure of the network; network connectivity, density, centrality and 
clustering patterns; key organizations and individuals that are well-connected and central; 
delineate groups, coalitions and alliances; and map institutional interactions. SNA will 
also be used to identify ‘gaps’ in the network that may hold a potential for improved 
collaboration and information sharing. The R-based free software package ‘sna’ will be 
used to conduct network analysis. The sequence analytical package ‘TraMineR’ will be 
used to analyze career paths and skill sets, enabling inferences on connections between 
careers/skills and network characteristics. 
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3.2 Processes 
 
Partnership complexity as defined above operates through processual factors as it impacts 
sustainability outcomes. NEPSUS focuses on legitimacy building and maintenance, and on 
learning processes, but through a political economy, rather than an institutionalist, approach. 
This involves a focus on equity, access and power relations, and on institutions as they 
operate in a political economy, rather than on ‘ideal’ institutional features.  This entails a 
second group of research questions focused on processes. 
 
RQ2: Processes   
• How do different kinds of partnerships develop, gain and manage legitimacy among 
different audiences and stakeholders?  
• What kinds of legitimacy (input, process, output) do they seek and how? And which 
forms of legitimacy, if any, provide most power to local communities? 
• How does the history of relations between state, local communities, private and 
international actors influence participatory processes and interactions and power 
relations among actors?  
• What processes, if any, are successful in preventing powerful actors (public or 
private) from capturing the partnership process to suit their own interests? 
• What learning processes (if any) are taking place that may allow late-comers to 
leverage positive lessons and/or avoid the pitfalls of previous experiences? 
  
We will use qualitative thematic analysis, software-based qualitative data analysis, and 
survey data to examine three legitimacy categories that are commonly distinguished in the 
literature on sustainability initiatives: 
 
• Input legitimacy: participation of various categories of actors and groups in the design 
and operation of relevant partnerships; balance in the type, origin and function of 
stakeholders;  
• Process legitimacy: procedures allowing or limiting participation and democratic process; 
quality of governance procedures, system management, accountability, and transparency;  
• Output legitimacy: assessment of directly attributable output and changes over time (e.g. 
number of villages involved, area under conservation, quantity of certified timber, 
number of participants, awareness of partnership in the communities) vis a vis 
expectations. 
 
In each category of legitimacy, we will pay particular attention to levels of awareness,3 
participation and perceptions related to the partnership, different degrees of access and 
influence by communities, power struggles, politics, and dynamics of cooperation and 
conflict. We also examine how these partnerships are embedded internationally and 
nationally. Finally, we compare ‘early-mover’ (EM) and ‘latecomer’ (L) sites to assess 
processes and possible learning trajectories and differential outcomes. The logic of selection 
of these sites is tuned to the specificities of each resource sector, and will be detailed later in 
this paper.  
 
3 Gustavson et al. (2009:83) have rightly noted that different communities will vary in their levels of awareness, and thus 
distinguished them into two types, namely those that command a strong knowledge of conservation issues and engagement 
processes (branded as ‘enhance communities’) and, those that have little to no experience with externally-initiated 
consultation (labelled as ‘greenfield communities’). 
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3.3 Attribution of sustainability outcomes 
 
A third set of research questions have to do with attribution of sustainability outcomes:  
 
RQ3: Sustainability outcomes   
• What are the environmental, socio-economic/livelihood outcomes in partnerships with 
different configurations of complexity, and in different resource systems? How are 
these effects distributed among different groups of actors? 
• What are the synergies and/or trade-offs between socio-economic and environmental 
outcomes? What features minimize trade-offs and maximize synergies between them?  
• What instances of conflict and cooperation have emerged as a result of these 
partnerships? 4 In which cases have relations of domination between state 
administrations and local communities been transformed?  
 
NEPSUS takes a comparative study approach along three key dimensions that involve 
sustainability outcomes: 
 
• Comparison of sustainability outcomes between different configurations of partnership 
complexity, and between different temporal profiles of participation (early-mover and 
late-comer sites; see above). 
• Comparison of sustainability outcomes between different resource types: forestry, 
wildlife and coastal resources; in this component we seek to understand whether specific 
attributes of the resource type/system and associated institutional arrangements 
affect/influence sustainability outcomes.  
• Comparison of sustainability outcomes over time, when possible (before and after the 
introduction/implementation of a partnership).  
 
Analysis will span from basic descriptive statistics to econometric analysis. Where possible, 
quasi-experimental econometric techniques such as matching or instrumental variables will 
be employed to credibly attribute household-level outcomes to partnerships. Appropriate 
statistical analysis will be performed to jointly assess multiple environmental and livelihood 
outcomes to contribute in filling existing gaps in the literature. This will include assessments 
of trade-offs and synergistic relations between environmental and socio-economic outcomes.  
 
The NEPSUS case studies fall under the ‘multi-level governance’ approach whereby the 
interventions variously target individuals, households, villages and combination of villages. 
Our analytical approaches in terms of unit of analysis (individual, household, village, 
community of villages) will be aligned to the intervention type and supplied with sufficient 
description of how the intervention is implemented. Similarly, our units of analysis in 
assessing environmental outcomes will differ depending on the resource type.  
 
 
 
4 More recently there has been an admission in the literature that natural resources have increasingly become sites of both 
conflict and cooperation. More importantly, some studies have moved further to propose analytical frameworks that do not 
conceptualize conflict and cooperation one-dimensionally, i.e. on a continuum along a single axis but rather a multi-
dimensional approach that brings together three variables of conflict, cooperation and time (see, e.g., Martin et al 2011: 625-
626) and eventually adopting scales of conflict (such as high-level conflict; medium-level conflict; low-level conflict and no-
conflict), and scales of cooperation (for example, no cooperation; low-level cooperation; informal medium cooperation 
intensity; formal medium cooperation intensity, and high-level cooperation intensity). 
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4. Data collection methods  
 
NEPSUS employs a broad portfolio of data collection methods that the members of the 
research team have practiced over many years of work in Tanzania and elsewhere. Diversity 
of methods will enable critical reflection and triangulation of data. 
 
Key informant interviews (KII) are the main method of data collection to address RQ1 
(including the initial selection criteria for SNA) and RQ2. These semi-structured interviews 
will be recorded when allowed by interviewees. Interviewees will be offered a statement of 
confidentiality to ease the conversation in case particularly sensitive issues are discussed.  In 
the interview situation, informants will also be asked to fill in a roster of their peer network 
within the partnerships, detailing the strength of their social ties and the frequency of their 
interaction. Questions about organizational collaboration will be included, allowing for 
mapping inter-organizational networks.  
 
Collection of secondary documents (SD): relevant texts, such as written agreements and 
MoUs, minutes of partnership meetings, reports generated by the partnership project and/or 
local government officials; secondary texts will be used mainly to address RQ1 and RQ2. 
 
Focus groups and participant observation (FG/PO): FGs are organized in local communities 
to gather data on perceptions of environmental and socio-economic change, and the history, 
dynamics, legitimacy and impact of partnerships. PO of partnership meetings and activities 
(when possible and allowed) will be carried out in areas of operation. These results will be 
used to address all three groups of RQs. This is feasible since the project involves three full-
time PhDs who will spend significant amounts of time in the study sites.  
 
A questionnaire-based survey (SUR) will be the main method to gather data for quantitative 
statistical analysis of socio-economic outcomes at the household and community levels 
(RQ3), perceptions of partnerships processes and functioning (RQ1 and RQ2), and 
perceptions of environmental outcomes (RQ3). In some areas, we will be able to carry out a 
longitudinal study by drawing from previous surveys.   
 
Households will be selected through stratified random sampling to ensure proportional 
representation under different strata (male and female-headed households; different 
poverty/wealth ranks; household location in the village between near and far households 
etc.). The questionnaires will contain the same modules across resource types in order to 
compare outcomes, but allowing for some adaptation to resource specificity.  
 
Data on environmental outcomes (EO) will be collected for both spatial and (when possible) 
temporal comparison. Main indicators for EO analysis will include resource conditions 
(quantity and quality) (Olwig et al. 2007) and changes in anthropogenic threats to resources.  
 
• Forestry: geo-spatial analytics of aerial images and remotely sensed images will be 
combined with on-the-ground data on forest conditions to assess and compare forest 
conditions over time and space; most of this data is readily available from MCDI, village 
natural resource committees, and UDSM (some of the team members have been involved 
in gathering these data in the past); collaboration with the University of Edinburgh and 
the University of East Anglia will allow access to previous databases and images, and a 
follow up assessment; these will be complemented by perception data from KII, SUR and 
FG. 
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• Wildlife: data on animal population and wildlife habitats conditions will be gathered from 
secondary sources: population count surveys available at TAWIRI and respective WMAs; 
specialized NGOs on wildlife research such as Southern Tanzania Elephant Project 
(STEP), and the World Elephant Center (WEC) and from primary sources (perception 
data from SUR and FG); disturbance transects will be conducted to assess 
presence/absence, severity an extent of various threats to wildlife habitats; perceptions 
and records of crop raiding and human-wildlife conflict will be used to examine how 
human and wildlife interactions are changing.  
 
• Coastal resources: data on fish catch, volume, species and size are available at the district 
fishery office and/or the MBREMP office, but their reliability will have to be assessed 
and triangulated with data from KII and FG/PO; indirect indicators will also be used, such 
data on rules violation, gear confiscated and arrests, and recorded explosions from 
dynamite fishing; assessment of mangrove conditions will be carried out by comparing 
GIS images and carrying out selected ground trothing; status of coral resources will be 
assessed via secondary data from the MBREMP coral monitoring programme and other 
studies. 
 
 
5. Site selection 
 
The NEPSUS project seeks to compare cases of governance partnerships in managing forest, 
coastal resources and wildlife in Tanzania. Tanzania provides an ideal case because of 
existence of all three resource systems managed under different partnership arrangements. 
Using all cases from one country reduces variation in government contexts and frameworks. 
Moreover, all cases from the same country share a similar evolution from centralized to 
decentralized management approaches that emerged around the same time from the late 
1990s.  
 
While the case studies differ in specific resource types and particular actors involved, there 
are several similarities across sectors that allow for meaningful comparison, such as the 
normative complexity of the objectives of the partnerships (all cases seek to attain both 
environmental and livelihood outcomes, while improving natural resources governance at the 
local level). In each resource type, we also seek to minimize variability by selecting sites that 
are comparable in terms of socio-economic and agro-ecological factors. At the same time, we 
aim at collecting and analyzing data on context, processes, and legitimacy that will allow a 
nuanced connection between complexity and outcomes.  
 
A preliminary complexity scoring to identify simple, more complex and control sites carried 
out at our inception workshop in Copenhagen in late 2016 later necessitated major 
adjustments – following preliminary fieldwork that took place in February and March 2017 in 
Rufiji, Kilwa and Mtwara (see Figure 1), and a validation exercise with the NEPSUS 
Stakeholder Advisory Board in April 2017. The scoring included in Table 1 is still 
preliminary and will include more precise measurements after a second period of fieldwork in 
late 2017. The overall logic of selection is common, but important differences arise between 
various sectors due to the specific characteristics of ‘simpler’ and ‘more complex’ 
partnerships and their historical backgrounds in different resource groups. More detailed 
information on the various sites are available in the NEPSUS background working papers 
dedicated to each sector. 
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Figure 1: Location of the three NEPSUS study areas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Preliminary complexity scoring for site selection 
Institutional setup
Forest 
reserves
CBFM + FSC 
certification
None
Game 
reserves
WMAs None Marine parks BMUs + CFMAs None
Complexity factors
Number of actors medium high medium high medium high
Number of actor categories low high low high medium high
Complexity of the decision making 
system low high low high medium high
Degree of sharing among different 
actor categories in access rights to 
the resource low high low high medium medium
Complexity scoring simpler more complex control simpler more complex control simpler more complex control
General site selection
2 villages 
adjacent to 
national 
forest 
reserves in 
Kilwa
4 villages in 
Mpingo 
Conservation 
and 
Development 
Initiative, Kilwa
2 non-
CBFM 
villages
2 villages 
adjacent to 
Selous Game 
Reserve in 
Kilwa
4 villages in 2 
WMAs in Rufiji
2 villages 
close to 
the Rufiji 
Open 
Area
4 villages in 
Mnazi Bay-
Ruvuma 
Estuary 
Marine Park, 
Mtwara
2 BMUs in the 
MNASI CFMA
2 non-
BMU 
villages
Coastal ResourcesForestry Wildlife
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5.1 Site selection in forestry 
 
5.1.1 Simpler partnerships: National Forest Reserves in Kilwa 
 
Kilwa District has a number of national forest reserves that are owned by the central 
government and managed through the Tanzania Forest Service Agency (TFS). The TFS in 
Kilwa manages the natural national forest reserves and regulates timber business in them. 
Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFR) instead are managed by the communities and other 
actors (including NGOs). With special arrangements, communities can be engaged in 
management of national forest reserves through Joint Forest Management (JFM), but none of 
the villages selected for the NEPSUS project (Mitole and Hoteli Tatu) are engaged in it (see 
Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Forestry site selection 
Simpler partnership (SP) More complex partnership (CP) Control site 
Sites adjacent to National Forest 
Reserves 
Mpingo Conservation and 
Development Initiative (MCDI) Non-CBFM sites 
Mitole (Mitarure NFR),  
Hoteli Tatu (Mitundumbea NFR) 
Kikole, Nainokwe (early-movers) 
Likawage, Mchakama (latecomers) Ruhatwe, Mavuji 
2 4 2 
 
Figure 2: Map of forestry sites 
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5.1.2 More complex partnership: Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI) 
 
Community-based Forest Management (CBFM) was first introduced in Kilwa District 
through the DANIDA supported projectcalled UTUMI (Utunzaji Shirikishi wa Misitu 
Tanzania) between 1998-2002. At the end of the UTUMI project, the Mpingo Conservation 
Program, MCP (now the Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative, MCDI) took over 
these activities with the aim of facilitating certified sustainable harvesting of blackwood 
(Dalbergia melanoxylon, Mpingo in Kiswahili) and of enabling communities to benefit from 
forest conservation in their village lands.  
 
Villages that have been managing  their village land  forests through CBFM and joined the 
MCDI FSC®Group Certificate Scheme for more than five years (Kikole and Nainokwe) are 
considered to be early movers (EM) (see Table 1).  These villages were also involved in the 
UTUMI project that ended in 2002. Latecomer (L) sites include villages (Likawage and 
Mchakama) that have joined CBFM and the MCDI FSC®Group Certificate Scheme (GCS) 
within the last five years or less. These villages were not engaged in the UTUMI project, and 
established CBFM through MCDI only.  
 
5.1.3 Control villages 
 
Mavuji and Ruhatwe villages do not have VLFRs that are managed through CBFM, nor are 
they part of the MCDI FSC® GCS. Due to a number of factors such as failures of large-scale 
land investments (Bioshape investment in Mavuji village) and land disputes/border issues (in 
Ruhatwe village), these two villages have failed to manage their VLFR through CBFM and to 
join the MCDI FSC®GCS. They are thus considered ‘control’ sites for the purposes of 
NEPSUS.  
 
 
 5.2 Case selection in wildlife 
 
5.2.1 ‘Simpler’ partnership: Villages adjacent to the Selous Game Reserve in Kilwa district 
 
The Selous Game Reserve is an ecologically significant area – it is the largest game reserve 
in Africa (measuring 50,000 km2) and is the host of about 60% of Tanzania’s elephant 
population (Baldus and Hahn 2004). It was first established as a hunting reserve in 1905, 
upgraded to a game reserve in 1922, and designated a World Heritage Site in 1982 in relation 
to UNESCO criteria ix and x (significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation of 
biological diversity) (World Conservation Union 1982). In terms of landscape, the reserve is 
embedded within a larger Selous ecosystem that covers 90,000 km2 – including the Ruaha 
and Mikumi National Parks, several national forest reserves, nine Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs) that surround the entire reserve, and several Open Areas (game controlled 
areas).  
 
Two villages that border the Selous Game Reserve in Kilwa District (Kandawale, Kandawale 
A) have been selected to represent ‘simpler partnerships’ for the NEPSUS project (see Table 
3). They are are among nine villages that border the game reserve in the stretch between 
Liwale and Rufiji districts which were involved in community-based wildlife management 
activities of the Eastern Selous Conservation project. This project was phased out in 2000, 
when funding from the Belgium Technical Cooperation stopped. By that time, these villages 
had been involved in training of village committees and game scouts, sensitization seminars, 
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as well as land use plans. However, the partnership formalization in the form of a more 
complex WMA did not occur – due to lack of funds and a border conflict that emerged 
between the villages and the game reserve.  
 
 
Table 3: Wildlife site selection 
 
Simpler partnership (SP) More complex partnership (CP) Control site 
Game Reserve WMAs Non-WMA 
Selected adjacent to Selous 
Game Reserve in Kilwa 
MUNGATA and 
JUHIWANGUMWA in Rufiji 
Villages next to the 
Rufiji Open Area 
Kandawale, Kandawale A Ngarambe, Tapika (early-movers);             Ngorongo, Mloka (latecomers) Nambuju, Tawi 
2 4 2 
 
 
Figure 3: Map of wildlife sites 
 
5.2.2 More complex partnership: Two WMAs in Rufiji District  
 
MUNGATA – an early-mover partnership. This is a partnership of two villages (Ngarambe 
and Tapika, both selected for our study) that are located south of the Rufiji district at the 
northeast edge of the Selous Game Reserve. The two villages and the surrounding Kichi hill 
forest are home to a rich floral and faunal diversity of national and international conservation 
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importance. The area is a home to approximately 5,400 people whose lifestyles and 
livelihoods are intricately tied to the biological diversity and the functioning of this natural 
system. Land is an essential natural resource, both for the livelihoods of these people and for 
grazing of a variety of wildlife from the game reserve. 
 
Beginning in the early 1990s, GTZ worked with the Rufiji District Council to initiate 
community-based wildlife management in these and other villages around the game reserve – 
through the Selous Conservation Program (SCP). Later, WWF provided support for the 
formalization of partnerships through the establishment of a WMA. Having been registered in 
2006, MUNGATA is among the earliest WMAs in the country. It has been a model for other 
WMAs in the country in relation to successfully receiving wildlife user rights, attracting 
private hunting investors and building good relations with the neighboring Selous Zonal 
Station at Kingupira. However, this WMA has also experienced many kinds of conflicts 
emerging – including a court case with the hunting investor, increasing human-wildlife 
conflicts and internal leadership disagreements.  
 
JUHIWANGUMWA – a latecomer partnership. This is WMA including 13 villages which 
was formalized in July 2016. We randomly selected two villages for in-depth investigation 
(Mloka and Ngorongo Mashariki). Although this is a relatively new WMA, the involved 
villages have been involved in community-based wildlife conservation since the early 1990s 
through the Eastern Selous Community program, which was financed by Belgium Technical 
Cooperation until early 2000. Through an extension of technical and financial support by 
BTC and the European Union, a second phase started in 2006 focusing on the establishment 
of this WMA, which was slowed down by border conflicts between the villages and the 
Selous game reserve. These were resolved recently in a court case, hence allowing the 
registration of the WMA in 2016. This WMA has potential to attract both hunting and 
photographic tourism investors as it includes the famous Lake Utunge in its area. Utunge is 
an important part of the Eastern Selous wildlife sector and the home of a variety of wildlife 
and fish species. The area is also linked with the Kichi coastal forest, which is an important 
wildlife corridor.  
 
5.2.3 Control sites: Two villages adjacent to the Rufiji Open Area 
 
We consider villages adjacent to the Rufiji Open Area as control sites because they are in 
proximity of the Selous game reserve but have no form of partnership. Although wildlife 
utilization continues in village lands in which the district council issue resident hunting 
licenses, there is no formal partnership with villages in which hunting takes place. Open 
Areas are village lands, which happen to accommodate wildlife that overflow from protected 
areas. Wildlife is only marginally protected in these areas as villagers are not formally 
involved in conservation. Although the Open Area status allows District Councils to issue 
resident hunting licenses, the control of hunting in this arrangement presents significant 
challenges as illegal activities have increased rapidly in the recent years. Two villages from 
this area were selected randomly (Nambunju and Tawi). However, during preliminary 
fieldwork in early 2017, armed conflict between poachers, local community leaders and the 
police escalated, thus increasing the security risk faced by the research team. A decision on 
whether to return to these sites or select other sites that serve the same purpose will be taken 
during the second phase of fieldwork. 
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 5.3 Site selection in coastal resources 
 
5.3.1 Simpler partnership: Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (MBREMP) 
 
Mnazi Bay and the Ruvuma Estuary were identified as priority areas for the conservation of 
global marine biodiversity in 1995. The Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park 
(MBREMP) was gazetted in 2000, the second marine park established in Tanzania after 
Mafia Island Marine Park (MIMP) (Government Notice No. 285, published on 4/8/2000). It 
began operations in 2002 with support by UNDP/GEF and the Fonds Francais Pour 
l’Environnnment Mondial (FFEM). The park is located in Mtwara rural district, Mtwara 
region and stretches from the north in Msanga Mkuu Ras near the entrance of Mtwara port 
for 45 km south to the Ruvuma river on the border with Mozambique. The park includes 17 
villages with 44,000 residents. It is characterized by three distinct agroecological zones 
(seafront, mangrove and riverine areas). The General Management Plan (GMP) of MBREMP 
defines four zones for conservation purposes, delineating to allocate particular uses: core or 
restricted use, specified use, and general use – plus a buffer zone around it.  
 
The main official aim of the park is to combine conservation and sustainable development. 
The  resources managed by the park include fish, mangrove, coral reef, seagrass beds and 
sandbanks. The main identified challenges are: overfishing, rapid population growth, 
emerging activities vis a vis exploration of natural gas and coastal development, dynamite 
fishing, collection of shell and sea cucumber, coral harvest, and coastal erosion. The current 
management plan recognizes the development of gas reserves in the area. The objectives of 
the park include protection and promotion of sustainable use of resources through zoning and 
(at least in theory) involvement of communities in its management. As shown in Table 4, we 
selected five sites within MBREMP to be able to cover all three main agro-ecological areas 
(seafront, interior and riverine), and to include experiences from villages that had joined the 
marine park early in its establishment (in 2002) and in a second wave of expansion (in 2005-
07).   
 
Table 4: Coastal resources site selection 
  
Simpler partnership (SP) More complex partnership (CP) Control sites 
MBREMP 2 BMUs and their CFMA Non-BMU 
Msimbati (coastal/early-mover) 
Nalingu (coastal/latecomer) 
Namidondi (mangrove) 
Mahuranga (riverine) 
Namela, Msanga Mkuu  
(MNASI CFMA) Kisiwa, Mgao 
4 2 2 
 
Villages located in MBREMP, in comparative perspective, are part of a more complex 
partnership than is the case for the two ‘simpler’ partnerships in forestry and wildlife. 
Furthermore, the difference in the degree of complexity of MBREMP compared to the 
BMU/CFMA setup is much smaller than for the other two resource sectors (see Table 1). 
Because MBREMP villages are actually located within the Marine Park (or in its buffer 
zone), rather than in contiguous areas (as is the case in forest reserves and wildlife reserves), 
we used a different selection criteria in terms of number of villages and comparative 
structure. We selected four villages for MBREMP to cover all three agro-ecological zones of 
the park, but also to distinguish (among coastal villages) between early-movers and 
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latecomers. For coastal resources, the comparison across SP, CP and control sites will be 
carried out only for the coastal villages, given that the other two MBREMP villages have 
significantly different livelihood portfolios and resource use patterns. These elements will 
need to be kept in consideration when the project reaches the phase of comparative analysis. 
 
Figure 4: Map of coastal resources sites 
 
Source: Harding (2005) 
 
 
5.3.2 More complex partnership: Beach Management Units (BMUs) and Collaborative 
Fishery Management Areas (CFMAs) 
 
BMUs are organizations that seek to facilitate community participation and collaboration in 
the management of coastal resources. BMUs bring together a group of stakeholders 
(government, community, NGOs, researchers, boat owners, fish traders, and money lenders) 
in a fishing community whose task is to manage, protect and conserve fisheries (Sobo 2012). 
In a BMU, the community is supposed to be a steward of its own resources. The Tanzania 
guidelines for BMUs lists the following tasks: enforce the fishing act, prepare by-laws, 
ensure sanitation and hygiene, collect fish data and information, educate fishers, prepare and 
implement livelihood projects, ensure the security of people and property. For the NEPSUS 
study, we selected two BMUs that are located near the marine park and that have similar 
agro-ecological conditions to the coastal villages within MBREMP: Msanga Mkuu and 
Namela. Together with a third BMU (Sinde), they constitute the MNASI Collaborative 
Fishery Management Area (CFMA). These villages established their BMUs more or less at 
the same time, thus we do not differentiate between early-movers and latecomers (we do so 
in relation to villages within MBREMP). However, we differentiate these two villages along 
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another aspect: Namela is currently a quite active and functional BMU, while Msanga Mkuu 
is inactive due to internal leadership conflicts.  
 
CFMA activities include the carrying out of fish surveys, marking of fishing grounds, 
mapping the water area that belongs to the CFMA, help managing the fish camps, and 
facilitate patrols.  There are three operating CFMAs (all set up with WWF support) in 
Mtwara Rural District, and MNASI is the one contiguous to MBREMP. As a matter of fact, 
part of the water area demarcated  for MNASI is also part of the marine park, something that 
the two organizations will have to resolve, as the rules of fishery operation are quite different 
in the two institutional setups.  
 
5.2.3 Control sites 
 
The two sites selected as control (Kisiwa and Mgao) are coastal villages which do not have 
and have never had an active BMU, and are located in areas of similar agro-ecological 
conditions to the two BMU sites and the two coastal villages within MBREMP. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
This working paper set out to provide a framework for analyzing complex partnerships for 
sustainability in natural resource governance. Proponents of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
have argued that bringing different actors to negotiate the use and management of renewable 
natural resources ensures that all interests, concerns and aspirations are considered, and hence 
that outcomes are more likely to be sustainable and fair for all. Some scholars have argued 
that partnerships involving non-traditional actors bring resources and technologies that can 
improve efficiency and effectiveness in natural resource governance. But others have 
highlighted the difficulties arising from bringing different stakeholders with often competing 
demands and interests to bear on natural resource management and use, which can lead to 
inequitable distribution of rights, roles and power.  
The analytical framework presented in this working paper guides our research on 
configurations, processes and outcomes of evolving sustainability partnerships in view of 
different degrees and features of complexity. Although different forms of collaboration 
between state and non-state actors have been used in managing renewable natural resources 
for decades, broadly speaking we still know little on whether and how more complex 
organization structures, the involvement of more numerous stakeholders and more advanced 
participatory processes have delivered better sustainability outcomes, and if so in what 
sectors and under what circumstances.  
NEPSUS contributes in filling these knowledge and information gaps on the basis of three 
observations. First, the contexts dictating the emergence, implementation processes and 
outcomes of these partnerships have changed. Current partnerships involve local to 
international actors from  government, business, local communities, non-governmental 
organizations, consultants and certification agencies. This has resulted in expanded 
goals/objectives beyond conservation goals.  For instance, forests are now managed not only 
for their conservation and timber value, but also for their contribution to local livelihoods and 
climate change mitigation/adaptation. Involvement of other actors has also ushered new 
power dynamics, resources and changes in the distribution and concentration of power 
between different actors. Second, we still know little about partnership processes, especially 
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regarding how partnerships seek and maintain legitimacy, and which types of legitimacy they 
opt for and why.  Third, we do not know much about whether and how multi-stakeholder 
partnerships have delivered better combinations of livelihood and conservation outcomes. As 
a result, multi-stakeholder initiatives have tended to be skewed towards one set of outcomes 
at the expense of the other – resulting into tensions between stakeholders, poor outcomes and 
even the collapse of partnerships. NEPSUS seeks to combine detailed qualitative narratives 
of partnership interventions and quantitative statistical analysis of livelihood and 
conservation outcomes to strengthen arguments linking partnership characteristics and 
dynamics to their multiple outcomes.   
This inaugural working paper will be followed by others reviewing the specific literatures on 
governance of forestry, wildlife and coastal resources, and providing background information 
on the selected sectors and sites.  
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